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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the problem of monopoly provision of product warranties when consu­
mers are heterogeneous and when the probability of product malfunction depends on both the quality 
of the product and on the consumers' care. The optimal warranty contract is characterized to max­
imize the expected profit for the monopolistic seller. The properties of the optimal contract depend 
on the nature of the product. If the quality of the product is more important as a determinant of 
reliability than consumer care then standard results are obtained; that is, a positive correlation 
between warranties and reliability and between price and reliability are observed, and higher type 
buyers buy more expensive versions of the product with higher warranties. On the other hand, if 
consumer care is more important in increasing reliability, the results are exactly opposite; for exam­
ple, there is a negative correlation between warranty coverage and reliability. Also, when consumer 
care is important, higher type buyers buy versions of the product with lower warranty and lower 
quality. Other features of the optimal warranty contract are also characterized in this paper. 
1. Introduction
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In this paper, we are concerned with a monopolist's choice of prices and warranties when 
consumers are heterogeneous and when the probability of product malfunction depends on both the 
quality of the product and on the consumers' care. The consumers' valuations of the functioning 
product and care cannot be observed by the producer; the quality of the product cannot be observed 
by the consumers. A warranty is modeled as a payment to the consumer in the event the product 
fails. Because the cost of product failure to the firm is greater when the warranty is larger, products 
with higher warranties will be of higher quality. But when the warranty is larger, the consumer has 
less incentive to take care of the product and the product is more likely to fail. Because of these two 
opposite effects, the correlation between the warranties and observed product reliability may or may 
not be positive. As we shall show, if seller quality is a more important determinant of reliability for 
most products, a positive correlation between warranty coverage and reliability will be observed in 
market data and higher type consumers will buy more expensive products with higher warranties. If 
consumer care is more important in determining reliability, the results switch. This opens up the 
possibility that consumers who more highly value successful functioning of the product may 
nonetheless not buy versions of the product with higher warranties and higher quality. Their desire 
to have the product not fail may cause them to expend sufficient effort to make the warranty of rela­
tively little value to them especially when effort is significant in increasing reliability or is not so 
costly. As a result, they buy a version of the product with lower warranty and lower quality. This 
can occur even though the probability of successful functioning is assumed separable in product 
quality and consumer effort. 
A large literature exists about product reliability and warranties in commodity markets. 
Four theories have been proposed to explain the role of product warranties in sales transactions: 
exploitation theory, signal theory, insurance theory and investment theory.1 Exploitation theory
views warranties as devices used by monopolistic manufacturers to exploit consumers by unilateraly 
limiting legal obligations (Kessler [1943]). Signal theory treats warranties as messages signaling the 
reliability of the product (Akerlof [1970], Spence [1977]). Higher quality producers can afford 
more complete warranties since their products are less likely to break down. Thus, consumers may
infer the reliability of a product by inspecting the warranty. In contrast to theses theories, several 
empirical studies have found evidence that the correlations between warranty coverage and product 
quality, and price and product quality are weak and not necessarily positive (Priest [1981], Gerner
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and Bryant [1981], Garvin [1983] and Gerstner [1985]). Insurance theory (Heal [1977]) suggests 
that warranties provide insurance by the seller against variations in product perfoimance. So the 
warranties have an optimal risk-sharing property. But insurance theory does not explain why the 
warranty is not provided by any insurance company. Investment theory (Priest [1981]) views a war­
ranty as a contract that optimizes the productive services of a good by dividing responsibility 
between the manufacturer and the consumer to prolong the useful life of a product. This theory 
predicts that disclaimers of liability and exclusions of coverage will be observed in consumer pro­
duct warranties for those specific allocative or insurance investments that the consumer can provide 
more cheaply than the manufacturer. 
Recent papers have built foimal models along the lines of investment theory to characterize 
the optimal warranty contract by emphasizing the importance of bilateral moral hazard (Cooper and 
Ross [1985], Mann and Wissink [1986]).2 Observed product reliability is viewed as the joint out­
come of two actions, one taken by the fiim in making a product and another by the consumer in 
using a product. In Cooper and Ross's model, only a single consumer type is considered, and the
analysis indicates that, owing to incentive problems resulting from moral hazard, warranties offer 
only partial insurance. Mann and Wissink [1986] investigate warranties in a competitive market 
structure with several different consumers. Their analysis shows that equilibrium contracts involve a 
positive correlation between price and warranty coverage, but that observed product reliability may 
vary directly or inversely with both price and warranty coverage. In a similar model, Mann [1986] 
considers only unilateral moral hazard on the buyer side of the market. He shows that a single war­
ranty contract is offered in a competitive equilibrium, and that the contract offered by a monopolist 
separates consumer types whenever the competitive equilibrium involves a pooling equilibrium. 
Mussa and Rosen [1978] have discussed a model of monopoly provision of product quality.
In their model, a monopolist uses both price and product quality to screen heterogeneous consumers 
when the consumer's evaluation of the product cannot be observed by the monopolist. Consumers 
are risk-neutral and can observe the quality of any product they purchase. The single-crossing pro­
perty of the utility curves allows a characterization of the optimal monopoly solution in which the 
monopolist offers a broader range of qualities of goods and in which consumers of higher type buy a 
more expensive good with a higher warranty coverage. Matthews and Moore [1987] extend the
model of Mussa and Rosen by assuming that consumers are risk-averse. One of the contracts they 
consider includes a price, a quality level, and warranty coverage. They use a non-local approach to 
characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic. Their analysis shows that although the 
more eager types of buyers do pay higher prices and yield higher profit to the monopolist, they may 
receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage. 
To generalize both Cooper and Ross [1985] and Matthews and Moore (1987], we consider a
problem of monopoly provision of product warranties in the face of both bilateral moral hazard and 
. adverse selection problems. In our model, buyers are assumed to be risk-neutral, but vary with the 
willingness to pay for a single unit of the product. Product reliability depends on both the seller's 
precaution and the buyers' care. The monopolist seller can observe neither the buyers' care or their 
willingness to pay for the product, and buyers cannot observe the seller's product quality either. 
These result in a bilateral moral hazard and asymmetric infoimation between the monopoly seller 
and the buyers. We will emphasize the interaction of the bilateral moral hazard and the adverse 
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selection problems. As we shall show, this interaction will yield different predictions on price and 
warranty policies from those in the literature we discussed above. 
In the next section, we will specify our formal model of the monopoly design problem. The 
problems of bilateral moral hazard are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 considers incentive compa­
tibility due to the unobservability of the buyers' evaluation of the good by the seller and character­
izes the optimal monopoly solution of product warranties. We also derive some properties of the 
monopoly solution and compare these with the work of Cooper and Ross [1985], Mann and Wissink 
[1986], Mann [1986], and Matthews and Moore [1987]. A simple example is provided to illustrate 
our model and findings in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Basic Model
We consider contracts for a commodity which will be traded between a monopoly seller and 
many potential consumers. The product may or may not work after purchase. The "perfect" product 
is dependent both on the producer's specific investment and on the consumer's specific investment in 
a "production process". The probability that the product works is represented by 7t, called product
reliability, 0:::;; 7t:::;; 1. 7t is a function of two inputs: the quality level q provided by the producer in
making the product, and the level of care or effort e expended by the consumer in using the product. 
Both q and e are one dimensional variables, where larger values of q indicate higher quality and
larger values of e indicate higher level of care. We assume that the function 1t(q, e) satisfies
1tq > 0, 1te > 0, 1tqq :::;; 0 and 1tee :::;; 0 for any e and nonnegative q . This implies that the inputs are
productive at a decreasing rate in the production of reliability. For simplicity of analysis, we rule out 
the "production process" in which q and e are complements or substitutes, that is, we assume
1tqe = o.3
A contract between the seller and the consumer specifies a pair (p , w) where p represents
the price to be paid by the consumer for a single unit of the product and w is the refund that the con­
sumer receives from the seller if the product fails. We assume that there exists a third party who can 
costlessly determine whether or not the product works and enforce the terms of the contract without 
any dispute. In the mechanisms we consider here, the seller does not have to pay a fine to the third 
party if the product fails and the price paid by the consumer equals the price received by the seller. 4 
The monopolist sells a durable good for which each consumer is interested in buying one 
unit of the goods. Consumers are assumed to be risk neutral, but vary according to their willingness
to pay for a single unit of the product. A consumer of type 0 has a valuation of 0 dollars for a func­
tioning product. Income effects are ruled out. Each consumer's type 0 is a private characteristic, 
unobservable to the monopoly seller, but the seller has a belief that 0 is drawn from a random distri-
- -
bution F (0) with support [�, 0], where 0:::;; � < 0. The density function f (0) is assumed to be posi-
tive and continuous on [0, 0]. Given q and a contract (p, w ), the expected utility for a consumer of
type 0 with care level e is 
U (q, e, p, w; 0) = 1t(q, e )0 + [1 - 7t(q, e )]w - p - g (e ), (1) 
where g (e) is the consumer's disutility function for effort which is assumed to be the same for all 
consumers. We assume that e is nonnegative, and g (0) = 0, ge > 0 fore � 0, ge :::;; 0 fore < 0.
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The monopolist can produce any number of products with a quality level q at a unit cost 
c (q ). We assume that cq > 0, and Cqq > O. Then, the monopolist's expected profit obtained from 
each consumer who chooses the contract (p , w) and effort level e is
V (q, e ,  p, w) = p - c (q) - [l -1t(q, e )]w. (2) 
In this paper, we assume that functions 1t(q, e ), g (e ), c (q) and F (0) are twice differentiable and are 
common knowledge. 
Under complete information, q, e and 0 are all costlessly observable by both parties. The 
Pareto-efficient contract is an allocation (p , w , q , e) that maximizes the sum of the utilities since 
both parties are assumed to be risk neutral. The contract (p , w) is determined by *bargaining
between two parties. The Nash equilibrium (q, e) satisfies the following equations 
(3) 
(4) 
It is easy to check that both q and e are increasing in 0. Under the complete information, the consu­
mer with a higher evaluation of the functioning product will buy a higher quality product and take 
better care. 
3. Bilateral Moral Hazard
When the input levels are not costlessly observable by the parties, a bilateral moral hazard 
problem arises: the monopolist cannot observe the consumer's effort and the consumer cannot 
observe the quality level provided by the monopolist. This results in an incentive problem in enforc­
ing a contract. In this situation contracts frequently leave the input decisions by the parties 
unspecified. Rationally designed contracts anticipate the effect of contractual elements (p, w) on the 
ex post input decisions made by both parties. Input decisions are then self-enforcing. Generally, the 
monopolist offers a set of contracts (p , w) to consumers and then selects levels of quality q . Consu­
mers then choose the contract they most prefer as well as a level of effort e . The product is then 
observed to work or fail; if it fails the warranty is exercised. This process can be modeled as a two­
stage game played between the monopolist and the consumers. In the first stage, they sign a contract 
(p , w) under rational expectations, where p � 0, w � 0. The second stage takes (p , w) as given, and 
the players choose their inputs q and e noncooperatively. Payoffs are then realized after the condi­
tion of the product is determined. 
We first look at the second stage of the game for arbitrary (p, w ). The first stage of the 
game will be discussed in the next section. 
From the utility function (1) and (2), we obtain the first order conditions for Nash non­
cooperative equilibrium as follows: 
(5) 
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(6) 
Let q and e be the solution to (5) and (6). At equilibrium, the second order conditions are satisfied.
Since 1tqe = 0, the monopolist does not have to know the consumer's type e when choosing q. From
(5) we get q = q (w) if w > 0, and q = 0 if w = 0. Therefore, the assumption that 1tqe = 0 is very
important in this paper. From (6), we can get e = e (9 - w) if w < 9, and e = 0 if w � 9. When
0 < w < e, we can easily compute the partial effects of changes in w and e on q and e:
1tq I Cq <Jw= --�-�--
Cqq I Cq -1tqq I 1tq 
1te I ge ew =-ea=- ------­gee I ge -1tee I 1te 
Since 4w > 0 at equilibrium, higher warranty coverage results in a higher quality level for the mono­
polist. That is, when a contract specifies a high level of warranty coverage, product failure is relative 
costly to the monopolist, and the monopolist is willing to spend more to reduce the chance of this 
outcome. Therefore, from the warranty of the particular contract offered by the monopolist a consu­
mer can infer the quality level of the product. This is consistent with signal theory. But on the other 
hand, higher warranty coverage results in a lower level of effort by all consumers. That is, product 
failure is more costly to a consumer when the level of warranty coverage is low. Full warranty cov­
erage may result in consumers breaking the product deliberately. Because of these two opposite 
effects, observed product reliability may or may not be positively correlated with the warranty cover­
age. Let 
At equilibrium, product reliability 1t is a function of w and 9. Given e, taking the derivative of 1t 
with respect to w , we get
(7) 
Let g (9, w) = S [q (w )] - B [e (9 - w )]. Consider a product such that g (0, w) > 0 for all 9 and w.
That is, product quality is the relatively more important detenninant of product reliability or is less 
costly than consumer effort in the production of reliability. In this case, a high product reliability 
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will be observed if the contract specifies a high warranty coverage. In contrast, when g (0, w) < 0,
(consumer effort is less costly or more important to product reliability), a high warranty coverage 
will result in a lower observed product reliability. This result may explain part of the empirical evi­
dence found by Gerner and Bryant [1978] and Priest [1981]. 
The above partial analysis shows that observed product reliability 1t and warranty coverage
w may be negatively correlated for a given consumer type 0. What we actually observe in the data
is the different warranties and product reliabilities across heterogeneous consumers. Warranties vary 
with the consumer types, let us say, w = w (0). Observed product reliability is then
1t(8) = 1t{Q [w (0)], e [0 -w (8)]}. The question is whether a higher product reliability will be
observed for a consumer with a higher evaluation of the product and whether 1t and w are positively
correlated. If w (0) is differentiable, then 1t1(0) = g (0, w (0))w1(0) + ��. Since �� > 0, if
g (8, w (0))W1(0) � 0, then 1t1(0) > 0. That is, a higher product reliability will be observed for a higher
type consumer. In the next section, we will see that because of the unobservability of consumer
types the monopolist will design warranty contracts such that g(0, w(8))w1(0) � 0 for all 8, which
leads each consumer to reveal his type truthfully. 
4. Incentive Compatibility and Optimal Warranty Contracts
In this section, we analyze the first stage of the game. Using the input decisions by both par­
ties in the second stage, the induced expected utility for a consumer of type 0 who chooses a contract
(p , w) can be written as
U(p, w; 0) =1t[q(w), e(0-w)](0-w) +w -p -g [e(0-w)] 
Similarly, the induced monopolist's profit from a consumer of type 0 who chooses a contract (p, w) 
is 
V(p, w; 0) =p -c [tl(w)]- [ 1-1t[tl(w), e(0-w)]J w
At the first stage, the monopolist and the consumer behave as principal and agent, yielding a 
principal-agent model with adverse selection. The monopolist will offer a contract for each consu­
mer to maximize his induced expected profits subject to consumer's incentive and individual 
rationality constraints. By the revelation principle, we can consider the truth-telling mechanism 
[p (0), w(0)] without loss of generality. Then, the expected utility for each consumer of type 0, 
which is 
U(S; 0) = 1t{4 [w (0)], e [0 -w(S)]}[0 -w (0 )] + w(0) -p (0)-g {e [0-w (0)]}, 
will be maximized by reporting truth (0 = 0). The first order condition is
au (0; 0) 
, 
[ J , a0 'a=a=-p (0)+ 1tq<lw[0-w(0)]+1-1t w (0)=0 (8) 
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for all 0 e (0, 0). The second order condition is
2 - . a u (0 ; 0) U [ 2 A J 12 a02 'a=a=-p (0)+ 1tqqtlw[0-w(0)]+1tqtlww[0-w(0)]-21tqtlw -1teew w (0)
+ [ 1tqtlw[0-w(0)] + 1-1t] W11(0) � 0.
(9) 
Taking the derivative of (8) with respect to 0 and using the fact that ew = -e 9, we can rewrite (9) as
a2U(S; 0) A I 
ae 2 I a = 8 = -(1tq tlw + 1te ew )w (0)
 � 0.
Using (7), this can be written as 
a1t I I 
aw w (0) = g (0, w (0))w (0) � 0. (10) 
Therefore, we do have the restriction on w (0) that we discussed at the end of the last section. In 
order to interpret this condition, notice that 
au 
-=-1, ap 
and 
The incentive compatibility condition (10) implies 
a au au , > a0 ( - aw I ap )w C9) -O.
That is, when 0 changes, the warranty and the marginal rate of substitution between the warranty and
price have the same sign. Condition (10) is an extension of the usual monotonicity condition and 
refers to compatibility between the consumer's preferences and the contract [p (0), w (0)] offered by
the monopolist. 5 
Let U (0) = U (0; 0) be the maximum expected utility for the consumer of type 0. From the
envelope theorem, the necessary condition (8) is equivalent to 
u ' (0) = 1t{q [w (0)], e [0 -w (0)]} = 1t(0).
I I a1t Then 1t (0) = g (0, w (0))w (0) + a0 > 0. We have shown the following
(11) 
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Proposition 1: Local incentive compatibility implies: i) g (0, w (0))w '(0) � O; ii) 1t(0) is strictly
increasing in 0; and iii) U (0) is a strictly increasing and convex function.
Since g (0, w (0)) may change its sign over the range of 0, the necessary condition of incen­
tive compatibility does not necessarily imply monotonicity of w (0). Especially, w (0) and also p (0)
may not be increasing in a. This is different from what Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Matthews and
Moore [1987] have found. But observed product reliability 1t(0) is always strictly increasing in 0 
under the incentive requirements. 
Condition i) in Proposition 1 may not be sufficient for a contract [w (0), p (El)] to be incentive
compatible. We will consider two extreme cases each of which gives the consumer's utility curves 
the single-crossing property. In the first case g (0, w) > 0 for all 0 and w. That is, product quality is 
· th · d · · d 1. brr· s· a < au 1 au) o more important an consumer care m etermmmg pro uct re Ia 1ty. mce ae - aw ap > ' 
higher type consumers have steeper indifference curves in the (p , w) space. The marginal rate of
substitutions are ordered by type. Since the contracts we consider here include only two attributes, 
this ordering property is equivalent to the well known single-crossing property under which any dis­
tinct pair of the utility curves u (p' w; 0) and u (j5 ' w ; 0) intersect only once on the interval [0, e].6 
In this case, the necessary condition of incentive compatibility is simply w'(El) � 0 and, as w� will
show, it is also sufficient. For the second case, g (0, w) < 0 for all a and w. That is, consumer effort
is the more important determinant of product reliability and higher type consumers have flatter 
indifference curves. The incentive condition will now be w'(El):::; 0.
Proposition 2: Assume p (0) satisfies (8). If g (0, w) > 0 for any (0, w) then w 1(8) � 0 for all 0 is
sufficient for the contract fp (0), w (0)] to be incentive compatible. If g (0, w) < 0 for all (0, w) then
the sufficient condition is w'(El):::; 0 for all 0.
Proof: We only prove the result for the first case. The second case is proven similarly. Since we 
only consider continuous and piecewise differentiable contracts fp (0), w (El)], the consumer's
expected utility U (0; 0) is also continuous and piecewise differentiable. Let
11><0; 0) = 1tq4w [El-w(0 )J + 1 -1t{4 [w(0 )J, e [El -w (B)]}, 
aq>(0; 0) - - au (0 · 0) , - - , ... then a0 = g [0, w (0 )] > 0 for any 0 and e' and ae
' = -p (0 ) + $(0 ; 0)w (0 ) for all 0
- , - au(0 · 0) - , -and 0 . If w (0 ) = 0, then _' = 0. For any 0 < e and w (0 ) > O, we geta0 
au(� ; 9) >-p'(0)+$(0; B)w1(B)=Oae 
since $(0; 0) > $(0; 0) and fp (0 ), w (0 )] satisfies (8). Similarly, for any 0 > 0 and w '(0) > 0, we
obtain 
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These results together with the continuity of u ca; 0) imply that u (0; 0) is maximized ate = 0.
Q.E.D. 
Since the monopolist is uncertain about the consumer's taste for the product he sells, he 
faces a screening problem. Incentive compatibility requires that the price p (0), warranty w (0) and
quality level {j [w (0)) be nondecreasing in the consumer's type 0 when the monopolist's input is the
less costly and/or more important determinant of product reliability. But when the consumer's effort 
is less costly and/or more important, the results switch. This switching result can be explained as the 
joint outcome of adverse selection and bilateral moral hazard. The presence of bilateral moral 
hazard really changes the behavior of the consumer's utility function. 
Recognizing the incentive of the consumers, the monopolist maximizes its expected profit 
subject to the incentive and individual rationality constraints. Since U (0) is increasing in 0 from
Proposition l, the individual rationality constraints U (0) ;::: 0 for all 0 can be replaced by U (�) = 0.
From (11), integrating by parts, we obtain
!0u (0)/ (0)d 0= !01t{{j [w (0)J, e [0 -w (0)]}[1 -F (0)Jd 0
- -
From the definition of U (0), we know that p (0) = 1t(0)[0 -w (0)) + w (0) -g [e (0 -w (0))) -U (0).
Combining these two expressi9ns with the monopolist's profit function, we can write the
monopolist's expected profit as !en [0, w (0)lf (0)d0, where
n(0, w) = 1t[{j (w), e(0-w)][0-Z(0)] -g [e(0-w)] -c [{j(w)] 
and Z (0) = [1 -F (0)) If (0) is the hazard rate. Thus, the optimization problem for the monopolist is
(P) Max !9n[0, w(0)]f (0)d0
w 
subject tow (0);::: 0 and incentive �onstraint: (I) w'(0);::: 0 for all 0. For the second case, the optimi­
zation problem is to maximize !en [0, w (0)]f (0)d 0 subject to w (0);::: O and incentive constraint;
(II) w 1(0) � 0 for all 0. Let w (0) to be the solution to the equation nw (0, w) = 0, that is, w (0)
satisfies 
[ [0-Z(0)]1tq -cq] tJw + [ [0-Z(0)]1te -ge J ew= 0 (12) 
Substituting equation (5) and (6) into (12) and rearranging this equation, we get
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w (0) = Z (0) + [0-2Z (0)]r [0, w (0)] (13) 
where r(0, w)=r[q(w), e(0-w)] and r(q,e)= S(q��
q;(e) From (13), the derivative of w
with respect to 0 is 
, z'(0)(1-2r) + r + [0-2Z(0)]r9
w (9)= l-[0-2Z(0)]rw 
In the special case where S and B are constants, which implies r is a constant as well,
w '(0) = z' (0)(1 -2r) + r. Since we assume that z' (0) ::;; 0, then w '(0) > 0 when r ;::: 1/2. That is,
w(0) satisfies the incentive constraints w'(0);::: 0. Therefore, w(0) is a solution to (P) when r;::: 1/2.
That is, we obtain the optimal solution w *(0) = w (0). But when r , 1/2, the incentive constraints 
w '(0) ::;; 0 may not be satisfied by w (0). Therefore, w (0) is not optimal solution. In order to get a
complete solution to the optimization problems for the monopolist in general, we make the follow­
ing assumption: 
Assumption A: H (0, w) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave in w, and
w '(0) changes sign a finite number of times.
If rc(q, e ), g (e) and c (q) are three times continuously differentiable and f (0) is twice con­
tinuously differentiable, then H (0, w) is twice continuously differentiable. We can calculate
Hww =- [ S [q(w)] +B [e(0-w)]] [ 1-[0-2Z(0)Jrw] . When 1tqqq $; 0, 1Ceee::;; 0, geee;::: 0, and
Cqqq ;::: 0, then rw::;; 0. When [o/ (�)-2]rw $;/ (�), we obtain 1-[0-2Z(0)]rw ;::: 0 and thus H is
concave in w . 
In the first case where g (0, w) > 0 for all (0, w ), the optimization problem is
(Pr) Max !9H [0, w (0)]/ (0)d 0
w 
s.t. w'(0);::: 0
w(0);::: 0
Under Assumption A, Guesnerie and Laffont [1984] have shown the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to a problem similar to (Pr) without the restriction w (0) ;::: 0. The results are similar with
this restriction. We can state the results as the following: 
Proposition 3: Under Assumption A, there exists a unique piecewise differentiable solution w*(0)
to (Pr). When w*(0) is increasing, w*(0) is the same as w(0) which is detennined by the equation
(13). When w*(0) equals a constant w on some subinterval [01, 02], then w = w(01)= w(0i),
unless 0; e {0, 0} for some i = l, 2 in which case w = w (0j ), �here j *' i. When w *(0) is constant
on[�. SJ, th;n w*(0) = w if there exists aw > 0 such that !0Hw (0, w )d0 = 0, and w*(0) = 0 oth-
erwise. 
11 
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in Guesnerie and Laffont [1984]. In an exam­
ple we present in the next section, we are able to find an analytical solution w *(0). It is difficult to
get a solution to (P1) explicitly in general. Guesnerie and Laffont offer a constructive algorithm for
the optimal solution w *(0). 
Given the optimal warranty w*(0), we can calculate the consumer's maximum expected util­
ity U*(0) from (11) and the optimal price offer p *(0) as well. The price p *(0) is also piecewise dif­
ferentiable and nondecreasing in 0. From (8), when w *(0) is strictly increasing in 0, p *(0) is strictly
increasing in 0 also. w *(0) and p *(0) are constants at the same range of 0. Thus, we have an
optimal contract [p *(0), w*(0)] which is pooling for a set of consumers and separating for the other 
consumers. That is, the monopolist offers a menu of contracts p = P (w ), from which a set of consu­
mers choose the same price and warranty coverage, but the others choose different pricies and war­
ranty coverages. 
In the second case, we need to solve the following problem:
(P11) Max !0 H[0, w(0)1f (0)d0
w 
s.t. w'(0) � o
w(0) :2: 0
The same technique in Guesnerie and Laffont [1984] can be applied here. Under Assumption A,
there exists a unique solution w*(0) to (P11) which is nonincreasing in 0. When w*(0) is decreasing
(separating) within a subset of [0, SJ, it equals w (0). When w *(0) is pooling, it is determined in the
same way as that in Proposition 3. Similarly, the optimal price p *(0) can be calculated.
In summary, we have determined the monopoly solution p *(0) and w *(0) in two extreme
cases. In the first case we discussed above, price and warranty are nondecreasing in the consumer's
type. That is, higher type consumers purchase the more expensive product and get higher warranty 
coverage. The quality of product is higher as well. In the second case where consumer effort is the 
less costly and/or more important determinant of the product reliability, the results switch. That is, 
price, warranty, and quality are nonincreasing in the consumer's type. This switching result is dif­
ferent from Matthews and Moore's [1987] finding that the price is always nondecreasing in the
consumer's type. The difference comes from the fact that no moral hazard is considered in 
Matthews and Moore's model. In our model, consumer effort which is not observable to the seller
influences the probability of product malfunction. When this influence is very significant, 
consumer's desires to have the product not fail may cause them to extend sufficient effort to make 
the warranty of relative little value to them. As a result, consumers who more highly value success­
ful functioning of the product may purchase a version of the product with lower warranty and lower 
price and that is therefore of lower quality. 
In Mann and Wissink.'s (1986) model of the competitive case with the finite type of consu­
mers, they get similar switching results which relate to the single-crossing-property. But in their 
model, the correlation between the product reliability and warranty coverage is ambiguous. In our
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model, this correlation is positive or negative dependent on whether product quality or consumer 
effort is the less costly and/or the more important detenninant of product reliability, respectively. 
From i) in Proposition l ,  our model predicts that a higher product reliability is always observed for a 
consumer with higher evaluation of the product. 
Because of the interactions of asymmetric infonnation and bilateral moral hazard, the mono­
polist may not be able to separate consumer types. Pooling for different consumers happens at 
equilibrium in our model. This is different from Mann's [1986] result that the contracts offered by a
monopolist separate consumer types whenever the competitive equilibrium involves a pooling 
equilibrium. When we get a pooling equilibrium, the optimal warranty may be bigger than the 
consumer's evaluation of the product, that is, a full warranty coverage or even over-coverage is 
offered for low type consumers. 
We now consider the effects of incomplete infonnation on the separating solution. When 
the monopoly solution w *(0) is separating, it is the same as w (0) which satisfies (13). As Z (9) 
approaches zero, i.e. the complete infonnation case, (13) becomes w(9) = 0r [0, w(9)]. Because of 
bilateral moral hazard, r is strictly between 0 and 1 when the consumers expend positive efforts, and
thus the monopolist offers partial warranty coverage. This is the argument in Cooper and Ross's 
[1985] paper. When Z (9) is positive, i.e. the incomplete infonnation case, we have a similar result
for high type consumers at a separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: When the optimal warranty w *(9) is separating, it has the following properties: i)
if 0/ (9) > 2, then Z (9) < W *(9) < 9 ...- Z (0) for all 0 E (0, 9); ii) if 9/ (0) S 2, then there exists a type- - - - - -9* E (�, 0) SUCh that W *(9*) = 0* /2, Z (9) < W *(0) < 9 -Z (0) for 0 > 9*, and 
9 -z (0) < w *(0) < z (9) for a < 0*. 
Proof: i) If 0/ (0) > 2, then 0 -2Z (9) � 9 -2Z (0) = 9 -2/f (9) > 0 for all 0 E [9, 9]. From (13), we- - - - - - -
obtain z (9) < w *(0) <a -z (0) for all a. - - -ii) The condition <y (�) s 2 is the same as � -2Z (�) =:;; O. Since 0 -2Z (0) = 9 > O and
9 -2Z (0) is increasing, then there exists a type 9* e [0, 9] such that 0* -2Z (9*) = 0. Thus, from
(13), w *(9*) = z (0*) = 0*/2. When a > 0*' z (9) < w *(9) < a -z (0). When a < 9*' 
9-Z(9) < w*(9) < Z(9). 
Q.E.D. 
From the above proof, we notice that the condition <y (�) > 2 implies Z (9) < 0/2 which
means the hazard rate due to unobservability of the consumer's willingness to pay of the product is 
relatively low. In this case, 0 < w *(0) < 0 for all 0; that is, there is a separating equilibrium with
only a partial warranty coverage when the hazard rate is relatively low. However, when the hazard 
rate is high, consumers are more diverse. In this case, high type consumers (0 � 0*) will also buy
partial warranty coverage but the range of that coverage is more tightly bounded because w *(0) is
now between Z (0) and 9 -Z (0). Low type consumers either do not buy the product or buy the pro­
duct with full warranty coverage. Which they do, depends on whether consumer's care or producer's
precaution is the more important detenninant of reliability. We will show how this happens in the 
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next section by considering a simple example. 
Finally, we should notice that we have only solved the problem of monopoly provision of 
product warranties for two extreme cases. In the intermediate case where g (0, w) may change its 
sign over 0 and w, we are not able to find a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compati­
bility. Even if the local incentive constraint (10) is sufficient _for incentive compatibility, it is 
difficult to solve the monopolist's optimal control problem with this constraint. We need further 
study on this problem. 
5. An Example
In this section, we consider a simple linear-quadratic case to illustrate the results we have
shown in the above sections. We assume 
rc(q , e) = ae + pq 
and the cost of quality and disutility of effort are quadratic, that is, 
c (q) = yq2, g(e) = oe2 
where ex, p, o and y are all positive parameters, e e (0, 1/2cx], and q e (0, 112PJ. For convenience, we
normalize the constants and assume that p2/2y + cx2/2o = 1. Then r defined in Section 3 is a con­
stant, that is, r = p2/2y. We also assume that the consumer's type 0 is uniformly distributed on
(0, 1), that is, F (0) = 0 for all 0 E (0, 1).
As we discussed before, our model can be viewed as a two-stage game played between the 
monopolist and consumers. In the second stage of the game, each party chooses the optimal input 
level q and e given a price-warranty offer (p, w ). From (5) and (6), we get
and 
q (w) = � 2y 
e (0 -w) = cx(0 -w)20 
Then 4w = p12y > 0, ew = - ea = -cx/20 < 0 and re = cx20/2o + (p2/2y-a2/2o)w. Since
�: = -cx2/2o + p2/2y= 2r - l, for a given type of consumer the correlation between product relia­
bility and warranty is not necessarily positive. When r is small, that is, the consumer's care is more 
important for product reliability than the seller's contribution, observed product reliability will be 
negatively correlated with the warranty coverage. We can calculate the induced utility function for 
both the consumer and the monopolist as follows: 
U(p, w; 0) =-(3r -l)w2/2 + (2r -1)0w + (1-r)02/2 +w - p 
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V(p, w; 0) = (3r -2)w2/2 + (1-r)0w -w + p 
Both are quadratic in the warranty coverage w . The local incentive compatibility constraints (10) 
will be (2r -l)w1(0);;::: 0. As we showed in Proposition l ,  when r > 112, w'(0);;::: 0 for all 0 are 
necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility. When r < 112, the incentive condition is that 
w1(0) is nonincreasing in 0. In the case where r = 112, incentive compatibility does not place any 
direct restriction on the warranty w (0) except for equation (8) and (11). The monopolist's optimiza­
tion problem is then the following: 
(P) Max f01 [ -w2(0)/2 + [(3r -1)0 + 1 -2r Jw (0)] d 0
w 
s.t. (2r -l)w1(0);;::: 0 
w(0);;::: 0 
Proposition 5: There exists a unique piecewise differentiable solution w*(0) to (P): i) if r < 1/3,
then W*(0) = (3r -1)0 + 1-2r for all 0 E (0, l); ii) if 1/3 s;; r < 1/2, then w*(0) = (1 -r)/2; iii) if
r ;;::: 1/2, then 
w•(a) =F3, -1)0 + I -2r
Proof: See Appendix. 
if 0 s;; (2r -1)/(3r -1)
if 0 > (2r -1)/(3r -1) 
We have to check global incentive compatibility for the case r = 112. Since w*(0) = 0/2, we 
are able to calculate the maximum expected utility U *(0) = 02/4 and the optimal price
p *(0) = 0/2 -02/16 for all 0 from (11). Under the contract [p *(0), w*(0)], the expected utility for 
the consumer of type 0 who reports a is u (0; a)= u (0; p *(a), w *(0 )) = 0214, which is independent
of S . Each consumer of type 0 gets the same utility no matter what he reports. Thus, consumers will 
choose any pair (p, w) from the price-warranty schedule p = w -w2/4.
From Proposition 5, when the producer's precaution in reliability is relatively important (r is 
larger), high type consumers buy partial warranty policy, and low type consumers do not buy the 
product at all. When r is very small, low type consumers buy too much coverage. The interesting 
case is when 113 s;; r < 1/2 and the optimal contract involves pooling. The monopolist prefers not to
discriminate among heterogeneous consumers and thus each consumer buys a version of the product 
with the same price-warranty coverage. In this case, optimal warranty policy makes low type consu­
mers buy too much coverage. 
Finally, we should point out that there is a discontinuity of our model. The optimal warranty 
policy w *(0) is not continuous at r = 112. When r approaches, but is less than, 112, w *(0) 
approaches 114 for all 0. When r approaches, but larger than, 1/2, then w *(0) approaches 0/2 for all 
0. We do not yet have a good explanation for this discontinuity.
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6. Concluding Remarks
We have considered the problem of monopoly provision of product warranties in the face of 
both bilateral moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Buyers are heterogeneous according to 
their willingness to pay for the good in our model. The results indicate that, whether higher value 
buyers buy products with higher quality and fuller warranties or buy lower quality and lower warran­
ties, depends upon the relative contributions made by seller quality and buyer care in enhancing pro­
duct reliability. If seller quality is a more important determinant of reliability for most products, a 
positive correlation between warranty coverage and reliability will be observed in the data and 
higher type buyers will purchase more expensive products with higher warranties. If consumer care 
is more important in determining reliability, the results switch. This shows us that the correlation 
between the warranties and observed reliability may be negative for some products and that consu­
mers who value the product more may still buy the version of the product with low warranty and low 
quality. Optimal pooling contracts may also exist. The monopoly seller may not be able to discrim­
inate among. heterogeneous buyers because of the complex interactions between bilateral moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. But for any product, our model predicts that higher product 
reliability is always observed to be correlated with higher types of buyers. 
We have introduced moral hazard into a principal-agent problem with adverse selection. 
Both the principal and the agent face a moral hazard due to the unobservability of the other's action. 
As we have seen, bilateral moral hazard and adverse selection interact in very complex and interest­
ing ways. We are only able to solve the problem for two extreme cases in this paper. For the more 
general case, in which the agent's utility curves for different contracts are not of the single-crossing 
type, it is difficult to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility by 
using the local (differential) approach. The non-local approach along the line taken by Matthews 
and Moore [1987) might be useful. Further study on this topic is needed.
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let w(0) = (3r -1)0 + l -2r and a(0) = (2r -l)w1(0). Then problem
(P) can be written equivalently as
O") Max r [ - ; w2(9) +>C(9)w(9)] d9
w,a 
s.t. (2r - l)w1(0) =a (0) 
w(0);;:: 0, a(0);;:: 0
If r = � , We Can get a SOlUtiOn W*(0) = W(0) = � 0 for all 0 E (0, 1). If r #: � , let 
A 1 2 A.aH (0, w, a , A,) = -2w + w (0)w + 2, _ 1 
is the Hamiltonian to (P1) with the state variable w, the control variable a, and the multiplier A..
Then the necessary conditions for the optimal control problem (P1) are the following (see Hadley
and Kemp [1971], Theorem 5.4.1, p.291): 
w1(0) = a(0)!(2r -1)
t..' (0) = w (0) -w (0) + µ2(0)
µ1 (0)a (0) = µz(0)w (0) = 0
A.(0) = /..(1) = 0 
where µ1 (0) is continuous in 0. Since H is concave in (w, a), and R 1 = -a, R 2 = -w are all con­
vex in (w, a), the sufficient conditions are satisfied (see Hadley and Kemp (1971], Theorem 5.7.1,
p.298).
We first consider the case in which r > � . When 0 � 00 = (2r -1)/(3r -1), w (0) � 0.
Then, w*(0) = 0 for all 0 � 0o. If not, there exists a 0' � 01 such that w*(0') > o. which implies
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µ2(0') = 0 and /..,' (0') = w *(0') -w (0') > 0. Since /..,(0) = 0 and /..,(0) � 0, there exists a e" (0 < e" < 01)
such that ')..,' (0'') < 0. This implies w *(0'') = 0. Since should be w *(0) is nondecreasing, w *(0) = 0 
for all 0 � e". For all 0 such that A1(0) � 0, we also get w*(0) = 0. For 0 such that A1(0) > 0, /..,(0) '# 0 
and w *1 (0) = 0. By continuity of w *(0), w *(0) = 0. It is also true for e', that is, w *(0') = 0. This 
contradicts w *(0') = 0. Thus, w *(0) = 0 for all e � 0o. 
When 0 > 00, 0 < w (0) < 0. Then µ2(0) = 0 for all 0 > 00. Otherwise, there is a e' such that
w*(e'') = O and /..,'(a')< 0. Since /..,(1) = O, there exists a e" > 00 such that /..,'(a'')> O. For all e such
that ')..,' (0) > 0, we get w *(0) > w (0) and w *1 (0) = 0. For all 0 such that ')..,' (0) < 0, which includes e',
w *(0) = 0. This contradicts the continuity of w *(0). Thus, /..,' (0) = w *(0) -w (0). Then we are able 
to show /..,(00) = 0. If not, because of the continuity of /..,(0), there exists an open interval I e (0, 1]
such that 00 e I and /..,(0) < 0 for any e e I which implies a (0) = 0 and w *1 (0) = 0 for any e e I. The
continuity of w *(0) implies w *(0) = 0 for all e EI. For e EI and e > 0o. ')..,' (0) = -w (0) < 0. Since
/..,(1) = 0, there exists a 01 such that /..,'(01) > 0 and /..,(0) < 0 for all e e (00, 01). Thus w*(0) is a con­
stant and the continuity of w*(0) implies w*(0) = 0 for any e e (00, 01). Thus A1(01) = -w (01) < 0.
This contradicts ')..,' (01) > 0. Therefore A.(00) = 0. This implies A.(0) = 0 for any e e (00, 1) by a simi­
lar argument. Thus, w *(0 = w (0).
In the case where r < � , similar to the above discussion, we get w *(0) = w (0) for all
0 E (0, l ].
Finally, we consider the case in which � � r < � . We claim a (0) = 0 for all e e (0, l]. If
not, there exists an open interval I !;;; (0, 1] such that a (0) > 0 for any e e/. This implies A.(0) = 0
and A1(0) = 0 for any e EI. We get w*(0) -w (0) + µ2(0) = 0 which implies µ2(0) = 0 since
w (0) > 0. Therefore, w *(0) = w (0) for any e EI. Then a (0) = (2r -l )w *1 = (2r -1)(3r -1) � 0
for e e I. This contradicts a (0) > 0. Thus, w *1 (0) = 0. Since
O = A.(1) = J \w* -w(0)]d0 =w* -J \(3r -1)0 + l -2r]d0,0 0 
1 we get w* = Z( l  -r). 
Q.E.D. 
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1. Priest [1981] offers an excellent review of the exploitation and signal theories and their practi­
cal implications. He also discusses the investment theory in detail.
2. In Cooper and Ross's [1985] paper, they called the hidden actions faced by both the seller and
buyer double moral hazard. We prefer to use bilateral moral hazard to emphasize the bilateral
nature of each contract and the moral hazard which each party imposes upon the other.
3. In the next section, we will see the importance of this assumption in determining the Nash
equilibrium (q, e). Without knowing the consumer's type the monopolist can choose a quality
level which depends on the warranty coverage. When 1tqe '# 0, product quality and consumer
care are complements or substitutes in the production of reliability and multiple equilibria may
arise. Equilibrium selection and coordination become important issues. We do not consider
these problems in this paper. See recent paper by Bigelow, Cooper, and Ross [1988] for discus­
sions in this topic.
4. Kambhu [1982] considers both a balanced mechanism and an unbalanced mechanism. In his
model of product quality, observed product quality is assumed to be a deterministic function of
seller quality and buyer care and hence there is no warranty problem.
5. Guesnerie and Laffont [1984] have a similar condition for a more general principal-agent prob­
lem with no moral hazard, which they call a condition of minimal compatibility.
6. Matthews and Moore [1987] have a further discussion about the relationship between the
single-crossing property and the ordering of marginal rate of substitutions by type.
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